






Domination and Liberation of Nature
Two Stages of Emancipation
Abstract
The paper addresses the scope of the human relationship to nature. This scope encompasses 
a twofold emancipation. The first emancipation is the emancipation from nature that en-
ables  the  domination  of  nature  by  science  and  technology.  The  second  emancipation  is  
the emancipation from this first emancipation, stemming from the insight that we have to 
conceive of nature, and respect nature accordingly, as another self that displays itself. I 
argue that it is precisely the step towards such second emancipation that lies at the core of 
the revolution of our consciousness of nature that currently seems to be unfolding. Yet the 
urgent question arises as to how such a “liberation of nature” (Hegel) can be understood 
sustainably without falling behind the achievements of Kantian philosophy, into a dogmatic 
ontology or even naturalism. The article delineates a systematic answer to this question by 

























the	concept	of	inner purposiveness.2 Immediately connected to this is the idea 
that	the	“nature”	of	a	being	involves	normative	implications	for	our	conduct.	





















reflection”,	 i.e.	 a	 rigid	 opposition	 between	 subject	 and	 object	 within	 con-
sciousness	 in	 the	sense	 that	 the	subject	 imagines	 itself	as	“autonomous”	 in	
terms	of	being	an	isolated,	detached	power	in	relation	to	external	objectivity.	
Overcoming this standpoint of reflection seems to be the underlying motif 








work in standard ecology.
Nevertheless,	there	are	at	least	two	serious	philosophical	problems	that	need	












take  seriously  that  the causa finalis	 can	never	 be	 a	 legitimate	 object	












Thus, life’s logic demands a logic capable of conceiving the logical form 
itself not as a rigid tool used by an external understanding but as a form 





2	   
For	 the	 concept	 of	 inner	 purposiveness	 as	
opposed	 to	 relative	 or	 finite	 purposiveness	
cf.	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 Critique  of  Judgement,	 
translated	 by	 John	 H.	 Bernard,	 Macmillan,	
London 21914,	§	63,	pp.	268–271,	and	Georg	




3	   
It	 is	 common	 to	 speak	 of	 inherent	 “value”	
instead	 of	 “goodness”.	 This	 is	 misleading	
because	the	worth	or	value	of	something	is	a	
positing	 of	 reflection	 that	 expresses	 the	 pre-
served	 possibility	 of	 satisfying	 a	 need.	 The	
proper	 placement	 of	 these	 concepts	 is	 the	
market.  They  denote  something  inherently  
relative	 and	 conditional,	 whereas	 the	 good-
ness	 of	 something	 is	 precisely	 that	which	 is	
inherently	 independent	 of	 the	 evaluation	 of	
an	 external	 reflection.	 Cf.	 Georg	 Wilhelm	




4   
Since	 it	 is	 ultimately	 inevitable	 for	 the	 un-
derstanding	 of	 an	 organism	 to	 engage	 with	
the	principle	of	inner	purposiveness,	we	find	
“neo-teleological”	 approaches	 in	 recent	 phi-
losophy	 of	 science.	 Cf.	 Thomas	 L.	 Short,	
“Darwin’s	 concept	 of	 final	 cause:	 neither	
new	 nor	 trivial”,	 Biology and Philosophy 






Emergence	 of	 Purpose.	A	 Peircean	 Perspec-
tive”,	Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 
2	 (2015)	2,	pp.	194–215,	doi:	 https://doi.org
/10.1628/219597715x14369486568455;	 Ter-
rance	 William	 Deacon,	 Incomplete Nature: 
How  Mind  Emerged  from  Matter,	 Norton,	
New	 York	 2013.	 We	 find	 here	 attempts	 to	




5	   




distinction	 between	 cause	 and	 effect	 cannot	
be made any more within their mathematical 
models. But this is not to say that the distinc-
tion	between	cause	and	effect	is	superfluous.	
Rather,	 it	 shows	 that	 mathematical	 models	
operate	with	a	more	subtle	differentiation	be-
tween	cause	and	effect	if	these	models	should	
serve  as  a  tool  to  represent  and  predict  the  
behaviour	 of	 a	 “self-organising	 system”.	All	
forms	of	modelling	are	ultimately,	as	Kant	has	
demonstrated,	propelled	by	the	“drive”	of	rea-
son  to  establish  unambiguous  determination  










some	point,	be	overcome.	Natural	 science	necessarily	 abstracts	 from	
the	individual	because	of	its	method.	Its	concern	is	not	the	individual	as	
such	but	the	“supersensible	world”	of	natural	laws	and	forces,	accord-
ing to which the individual has to be regarded as mere appearance.7 This 
means that  science cannot  provide the means to overcome the stand-
point	of	 reflection.	 On	the	contrary,	science	 is	 itself	an	expression	of	
this	standpoint.	Accordingly,	the	goodness	of	a	being	is	not	a	category	
of	science.	If	an	ecologist	addresses	inner	purposiveness	in	nature,	one	
should be aware that he no longer speaks as a scientist but engages in 
the	field	of	philosophy.
(2)	At	 this	point,	 the	next	 and	more	profound	difficulty	 emerges:	how	can	
the	idea	of	inner	purposiveness	be	systematically	justified?	The	trouble	with	
the	majority	 of	 the	 approaches	of	 philosophy	 is	 that	 they	 fail	 to	 recognise	
the logical dimension	of	 this	problem	with	 the	 result	 that	–	while	 trying to  
overcome	the	standpoint	of	reflection	–	most	philosophical	approaches	resort	to	
phenomenological	descriptions	or	simply	the	demand	for	empathy.8 Ultimate-



















is	how	 to	overcome	 the	 standpoint	of	 reflection	 without	 falling	behind	 the	
reflection	 that	has	been	achieved	by	the	critical	Kant and becoming trapped 
in unsustainable pre-critical approaches or even in naturalism. Only through 













1. On Consciousness and the Relation to Nature
After	Kant,	and	even	more	so	after	Hegel,	it	would	be	naive	to	address	nature	
in intentione recta  without at  the same time considering consciousness and 
freedom.	This	is	why	we	start	with	some	introductory	remarks	on	the	concept	
of	consciousness	–	concerning	its	interrelatedness	with	the	concept	of	nature	
in the broadest possible sense.












sciousness never achieves its identity in immediate	relation	to	itself.9 In addi-
tion	to	this,	consciousness	also	implies	the	relation	of	the	subject	to	the	other	
I,	the	partner.	I	think	and	say	something	in	relation	to	myself	and	the	partner	
with whom I share the experience made. Consciousness is the simultaneity 
of	the	relation	subject-subject	and	the	relation	subject-object.	It	is	vital	to	un-
derstand	that	the	relata	are	not	fixed	givens	to	which	the	relation	is	externally	






the Spirit	and	the	third	part	of	his	Science of Logic.
6	   
I.	Kant,	Critique of Judgement,	§	75,	p.	309.	





for	 this	 reason,	 fail	 to	 capture	 the	 “logic	 of	




7	   
Cf.	 Georg	 Wilhelm	 Friedrich	 Hegel,	 Phe-
nomenology  of  Spirit,	 translated	 by	 Arnold	
V.	 Miller,	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 Oxford	 
 
1977,	chapter	“Force	and	the	Understanding:	
Appearance	 and	 the	 Supersensible	 World”	
(pp.	79–103).
8	   
Arne	 Naess	 stresses	 the	 necessity	 to	 “iden-
tify”	with	 nature	 or	 natural	 beings	 invoking	
certain	feelings	in	terms	of	an	non-scientific,	
individual	experience	of	our	kinship	with	nat-
ural beings as individuals.
9   







to	nature	 is	 in	a	certain	sense	already	entailed	by	 the	very	concept	of	con-
sciousness.	However,	 by	 saying	 I	 to	myself,	 I	 distinguish	myself	 from	my	




being	 sets	 themselves	 in	 relation	 to	 their	world,	 to	nature	and	history.	The	
human being is	not	just	nature,	instead,	they	have	nature,	they	have a world. 
Having	nature	means	to	know	nature,	to	interpret	it.	However,	this	is	only	the	
first	 and	abstract	aspect	of	freedom.	According	to	Hegel,	concrete	freedom	
means to be with oneself in the other.	The	logic	of	freedom	coincides	with	the	
movement	of	consciousness	mentioned	before.
Bearing	this	in	mind,	we	can	say	that	it	is	not	sufficient	 to	define	the	human	


























dom against	 nature,	 but,	 rather,	 as	 the  emancipation  from  the  standpoint   



















2.  The First Emancipation: 













The Signature of the Understanding
How	does	understanding	proceed?	Two	basic	aspects	are	crucial:
(1) A separation of thought and intuition:	The	first	 emancipation	in	relation	
to	nature	depends	on	the	emancipation	of	thought.	Thought	or	reflection	 in-





ist.	However,	 the	 understanding	 demands	 that	 only	 that	which	 is	 identical	
with	itself,	i.e.,	that	which	can	be	conceived	of	without	contradiction,	may	be	
10	   
We	find	 this	 e.g.	 in	Arnold	Gehlen’s	anthro-
pology.
11   
Cf.	G.	W.	F.	Hegel,	Outlines of the Philosophy 
of Right,	§	7.
12	   
To	avoid	a	possible	misunderstanding,	I	shall	
stress	that	the	above-mentioned	“standpoints”	
are	 not	 arbitrary	 in	 terms	 of	 perspectivism.	
Instead,	 they	express	 the	distinct	 logical	sta-
tus	 of	 thought	 and	 the	 unity	 of	 thought	 and	
being	 in	 terms	 of	Hegel’s	 Science  of  Logic. 
The	first	 emancipation	 stands	on	 the	ground	
of	the	“logic	of	essence”,	whereas	the	second	
emancipation expresses the Hegelian concept 
of	the	concept.	This	applies	to	the	distinction	 
 




Hegel’s Science of Logic,	pp.	664–665.




dia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic 
Outline,	Part	II,	§	246,	Addition),	p.	197.
14   
G.	W.	F.	Hegel,	Philosophy of Nature (=	En-






conceived without thinking together opposite sides.
Historically	 speaking,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 determining	 understanding	 in	
Parmenides	 was	 a	 fundamental	 change	 regarding	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
world  that  has  been  prevalent  in  Homer  and  Hesiod’s  myth.  The  myth  de-
veloped	what	Humboldt	later	describes	as	the	“sympathetic	worldview”,	the	
experience	of	the	deepest	affinity	with	the	other	(innigste Verwandtschaft im 
Fremden).	This	means	an	experience	of	nature	in	divine	forms,	uncontrollably	
destructive	but	also	helpful	to	humans.






since	 formal	 logic	and	 its	highest	principle,	 the	 law	of	non-contradiction,15 
is	the	hidden	motor	of	the	technical-practical	conduct,	of	all	exact	sciences.
What	do	we	see	here?	We	have	two sides of an alienation.	First,	thought	is	
alienated	from	an	actuality	that	presents	itself	to	all	the	senses.	Such	a	thing	
that is intelligible and sensuous or ideal and	real	at	the	same	time	(cf.	οὐσία	
αἰσθητή	in	Aristotle,	even	any	word	in	human	speech),	amounts	to	sheer	non-
sense	for	the	standpoint	of	formal	logic.














the	very	act	of	saying	“I”.	Herein	lies	the	“infinite	difference”19 between the 
human	being	and	natural	beings.	This	difference	initially	allows	for	the	hu-
man	being’s	technical-practical	relationship	to	nature.	It	is	at	this	point,	where	
the	“finite-teleological	point	of	view”20 emerges. Only man can utilise nature 






The	question	 arises,	what	 external	 purposiveness	means.	As	Hegel	 puts	 it,	
“nature	does	not	contain	the	absolute	final	purpose	in	itself”.21 It means that 




self.	The only end acknowledged here is a human being themselves, imagined 
as an isolated, autonomous agent in opposition to nature.	Here	we	claim,	as	
Hegel	says,	our	right against nature because it is in a human being that nature 
has	come	to	consciousness	of	itself.	The	fact	that	this	right	is	for	the	same	rea-
son connected to certain obligations toward nature will only be acknowledged 
in the second emancipation.




to	an	abstract	opposition	 to	nature,	our	action	 toward	nature	at	first	 simply	





desire at this stage. 











15	   
Some	branches	of	modern	formal	logic	deny	
that.	 For	 instance,	Dialetheism	 assumes	 that	
the	soundest	justification	of	this	principle	is	to	
be	 found	 in	Aristotle.	Formal	 logic	excludes	
the	insights	transcendental	philosophy	(Kant,	
Fichte)	 and	dialectical	 logic	 have	gained	 re-
garding	 the	 justification	 of	 consistency’s	de-
mands.
16	   
This	becomes	explicit	in	modern	formal	logic	
insofar	the	mediation	of	thought	and	being	is	
understood	 as	 a	 function.	Drawing	 an	 infer-
ence is understood as a mechanical operation 
with	signs,	as	an	automatable	deduction	pro-




17	   
G.	W.	F.	Hegel,	Outlines of the Philosophy of 
Right,	§	5.
18	   
Logically	 speaking,	 this	 negation	 is	 under-
stood	 as	 an	 infinite	 judgment.	 This	 means	
that	 the	 subject	 has	 nothing	 whatsoever	 in	 
 
common with nature in the sense that it does 
not	fall	under	the	class	of	things	of	nature.
19   
Cf.	 G.	W.	 F.	 Hegel,	Aesthetics.  Lectures  on  
fine Arts,	 vol.	 1,	 translated	by	Thomas	Mal-
colm	Knox,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
1975,	p.	80.
20	   
G.	W.	F.	Hegel,	Encyclopaedia of  the Philo-
sophical Sciences,	Part	II,	§	245.
21	   
Ibid.
22	   
It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 expression	 τέχνη	
cannot  be  adequately  rendered  in  Eng-
lish	 by	 a	 single	 word.	 While	 τέχνη	 (also	
the  German  Technik)	 means	 primarily	 the	
power  or  ability  to  produce  something   
(according	 to	Aristotle,	 τέχνη	 is	 understood	
as  a  dianoetical	 excellence),	 the	 term	 tech-









The Transformation of Nature  
into a Transparent World of Objects
What	is	conceptually	required	by	this	understanding	of	nature?	We	can	only	
master	nature	by	means	of	technical	knowledge	and	practice,	which	means:	
only	 if	 nature	 is	not	 being	 conceived	of	 as	 another	 self	 but	 constructed	 as	
a transparent and homogenous world of objects.	This	is	a	huge	shift	 in	the	















unity	of	causa formalis,	causa efficiens and causa finalis	(Aristotle)	–	must	be	













which	 is	 the	natural	 law	or	 the	 force,	 is	not	 an	actual  essence	 (εἶδος,	 spe-
cies)	any	more,	but	a	posited supersensible world.	Accordingly,	the	concept	
of	 the	 essence	 in	 contemporary	 science	 denotes	 the  totality  of  describable  
determinacy which can be gained employing “rigid designators” within the 
framework of modelled systems of phenomena	(“possible	worlds”).25 The es-
sence	of	an	electron,	for	example,	is	understood	as	the	totality	of	its	possible	
behaviours	in	all	possible	worlds.	Accordingly,	the	laws	of	nature	are	valid 




Today’s  science  has  become  theoretical  technology.27	The	 “will	 to	 power”	







here  is  nothing  but  the  space  in  which  the  determining  understanding  can  
preserve	itself,	preserve	its	abstract	identity.	There	is	neither	a	place	for	the	
otherness	of	nature	nor	nature	as	a	self	within	this	framework.
The Pinnacle of the First Emancipation
Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 a	 further	 step	 to	 be	 taken:	 the	 transformation	of	 na-
ture	 into	 designable	 “possible	worlds”	 of	 entities	 is	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	
the	transformation	of	these	objects	into	goods that represent a value that can 
be	measured	 in	 terms	of	money	and	 thus	can	 function	within	 the	econom-











23	   
Cf.	 Ernst	 Cassirer,	 Substance  and  function;  
and, Einstein’s theory of relativity,	 translat-
ed	by	William	Curtis	Swabey,	Marie	Collins	
Swabey,	Dover	Publications,	Mineola	2003.
24	   
The	 success	 of	 contemporary	 Theoretical	
Biology  and  Systems  Biology  is  powered  
by	 the	 use	 of	 mathematics	 and	 formal	 log-
ic.	 Spyridon	 A.	 Koutroufinis	 elucidates	 the	
shortcomings	 of	 these	 approaches	 when	 we	
seek	 a	 proper	 understanding	 of	 an	 organism	
in:	Organismus als Prozess. Begründung ein-
er neuen Biophilosophie,	Verlag	Karl	Alber,	
Freiburg	–	München	2019.
25	   
Cf.	Saul	Kripke,	Naming and Necessity,	Har-
vard	 University	 Press	 1982;	 Hilary	 Putnam,	
The Meaning of “Meaning”,	 University	 of	
Minnesota	Press,	Minneapolis	1975.






27	   
Contemporary	 biology,	 for	 example,	 has	
become  theoretical  biotechnology.  Study-
ing	a	science	today	means	learning	ways	of	 
 
designing  possible  worlds  in  both  thought 
experiments	(in	computer	simulations)	and	
in	real	experiments	(with	machines).
28	   
Cf.	 Thomas	 Sören	 Hoffmann,	 “Gezeigte	
versus	 sich	 zeigende	 Natur:	 Eine	 Skizze	
im	 Blick	 auf	 das	 Verhältnis	 von	 Labor	
und	 Natur”,	 Philosophia  naturalis	 43	
(2006)	 1,	 pp.	 142–167,	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.3196/003180206780324619. This 
holds	 even	 concerning	 the	 references	 to	
“self”	and	“selfhood”	in	the	above	mentioned	
“neo-teleologism”	 in	 which	 understanding	 a	
“self”	 as	 the	 self-sustaining	 form	of	 dynam-
ical	system	is	the	theoretical	reflection	based	
on	a	complex	form	of	efficient	 causality.	For	
the	 absence	 of	 an	 actual	 self	 in	what	 is	 de-
scribed	as	“self-organisation”	cf.	Spyridon	A.	
Koutroufinis,	Selbstorganisation ohne Selbst: 
Irrtümer  gegenwärtiger  evolutionärer  Sys-
temtheorien,	 Pharus	Verlag,	 Berlin	 1996.	 In	
contrast	to	“neo-teleologism”,	biologists	such	
as	 Adolf	 Portmann	 and	 Jacob	 von	 Uexküll	
captured	the	concept	of	an	organism	as	mani-
festation	of	a	proper	self	when	they	addressed	





pation because it  involves the maximum possible distance and the ultimate 
alienation	from	nature.	Whereas	the	“mythical”	relationship	to	nature	(Hom-
er,	Hesiod)	was	still	shaped	by	gratitude	and	reverence	for	a	nature	that	could	
be	 experienced	 as	 a	 divine	 power	which	 is	 ultimately	 beyond	 our	 control,	
such	a	perspective	has	been	replaced	by	the	criterion	of	profitability	 today.	
This	alienated	and	alienating	form	of	interaction	between	human	beings	and	







ing with issues regarding emerging technologies.
If	we	want	to	understand	the	logic	of	the	first	emancipation,	we	have	to	en-
gage	with	Kant	 first.	 Our	next	 question	 is:	what	 are	 the	 logical	 conditions	
of	 the	 possibility	 of	 this	 transformation	 of	 nature	 into	 a	world	 of	 objects?	
Kant	was	 the	 first	 to	 raise	 this	 question.	Let	me	 highlight	 some	 important	
results	–	because	we	can	go	beyond	this	standpoint	not	by	simply	jumping	to	
more desirable or seemingly concrete approaches. There is no way to a higher 
standpoint	and	a	philosophy	of	nature	other	than	through	Kant.
3. The Enlightenment of the First Emancipation: Kant
Kant	has	the	reputation	of	being	the	king	of	the	enlightenment.	This	is	justi-
fied	from	a	systematic	point	of	view	because	in	the	Critique of Pure Reason 
we	find	reflection	on	the	preconditions	of	the	technical-practical	relationship	
to	nature	as	a	world	of	objects.30	This	reflection	clarifies	that	the	relationship	











the  correspondence  between  thought  and  being.32	This	 unquestioned	 belief	
characterises	 the	 immediacy	of	 the	 standpoint	of	 reflection.33  Kant  was  the  
first	 to	realise	that	this	basic	premise	is	ungrounded.	This	insight	led	him	to	












The Critique of Pure Reason	demonstrates	the	relevance	of	formal	logic	for	
the	cognition	of	objects.	Transcendental	 logic justifies and limits the realm 
in which formal logic has its legitimate application. This is the first logical 
self-reflection of logical form.	Thus,	Kant	does	not	develop	an	“epistemol-










en	content,	but	has	 to	be	conceived	as	a	 forming	 form	which	constitutes	a	
















to	 the	understanding	(in	 terms	of	 the	Critique of  Pure Reason). Otherwise,	
we	would	never	be	sure	about	what	might	show	up	in	the	next	moment	–	we	
would be unable to make predictions which raise the claim to universal valid-
ity	and	necessity.	Thus,	Kant	has	indirectly	demonstrated	that	the	relevance	
of	formal	logic	for	cognition	is	limited	to	nature	as	a	system	of	appearances.
29	   
In	capitalism,	labour	no	longer	serves	to	earn	
money spent on goods that are necessary as a 
means	to	the	end	of	satisfying	needs.	Rather,	




30	   
According	 to	 Hegel,	 the	 core	 category	 of	
enlightenment	 is	 the	 transformation	 of	 all	




31	   
Cf.	 Bruno	 Liebrucks,	 Sprache und Bewußt-
sein,	 vol.	 4,	Die  erste  Revolution  der  Den-
kungsart.  Kant:  Kritik	 der	 reinen	 Vernunft,	
Peter	Lang	Verlag,	Frankfurt	am	Main	1968.
32	   
This	equally	applies	to	formal	logical	systems	
that	do	not	 accept	 the	 law	of	non-contradic-
tion.
33	   
The	 current	 prevalence	 of	 this	 belief	 in	 the	
field	of	analytical	philosophy	and	formal-log-
















technical-practical conduct is based on a necessary illusion (transcendental 
illusion),	to	mistake	totality	with	the	sum	total	of	thoroughgoing	determined	
objects.	 In	 fact,	 totality	 is	posited	merely	as	an	ought,	a	heuristic	principle	
for	 scientific	 research	 that	guides	 the	understanding	 in	 its	establishment	of	
objective	determinacy.





positive	result	of	transcendental	logic	in	our	context:	The objective validity of 
formal logic can only be secured if we understand “nature” to denote a model 
that establishes a functional relation between natural laws and appearances.




for	the	sake	of	(technical-practical)	orientation	and	action.34 This knowledge 
functions	like	a	coordinate	system	–	e.g.	in	terms	of	taxonomies	of	the	world.	
It	 provides	 the	 framework	within	which	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 individual	 encoun-
















habilitation	of	sensuality	against	 the	hubris	of	 the	understanding.37  But this 




















we determine  that  reality  can  be  placed  under  the  categories  as  something  
governed	by	rules.	With	Kant,	we	learn	why	scientists	and	technicians	must	
refer	 to	 a	 logically  blind  intuition	 if	 the	 conductor	 in	 the	 background,	 i.e.	
formal	logic,	is	to	maintain	leadership.	There	must	be	no	such	thing	as	a	man-
ifestation	of	nature	or	an	individual	experience	and	appropriation	of	nature.
The	most	important	result	of	Kant’s	reflection	 in	our	context	 is	 that	formal	
logic	guarantees	knowledge	qua	science	if	and	only	if	the	forms	of	thought	
and intuition are regarded as subjective	forms	–	as	positings	of	reflection.	It	is	
precisely	this	subjectivity	that	makes	scientific	 objectivity	possible,	namely	
objectivity	as	the	thoroughgoing,	unambiguous	determination	and	consisten-
cy	of	a	state	of	affairs.	Under the command of the principle of non-contradic-





34	   
One	should	refrain	from	resorting	to	the	prev-
alent dichotomy between instrumental knowl-
edge  (Verfügungswissen)	 and	 orientational	
knowledge (Orientierungswissen)	in	order	to	
highlight	the	distinctive	feature	of	philosophy	




35	   






formal	logic	lies	in	the	contradiction that the 
mover	 only	moves	 as	 an	 unmoved	mover.”]	
–	Bruno	Liebrucks,	Sprache und Bewußtsein,	
vol.	 6/2,	 Peter	 Lang	 Verlag,	 Frankfurt	 am	
Main	1974,	p.	65.
36	   
Immanuel	 Kant,	 Critique  of  Pure  Reason,	
translated	 by	 Paul	 Guyer,	 Allen	 W.	 Wood,	
Cambridge	University	Press	1998,	A	51,	pp.	
193–194.





Otfried	 Höffe,	Kants Kritik der reinen Ver-
nunft.  Die  Grundlegung  der  modernen  Phi-
losophie,	Beck,	Munich	2004,	pp.	81–83.
38	   
Space and time have to be regarded as order-





why existence is nothing but a modality	of	a	judgement	within	the	framework	
of	transcendental	logic.39 Kant is very instructive because he shows that blind-
ness to nature is the condition for being able to master it.






terms	of	the	good.	This	is	why	Kant	points	to	the	primacy of practical reason 
already	 in	 the	 first	Critique. In  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  we  learn  
that	 freedom	as	genuine	autonomy	is	not	attainable	 if	we	submit	ourselves	
to	the	imperative	of	technical	knowledge	and	practice,	saying:	You ought to, 
because  you  can.	According	 to	Kant,	 this	 leads	 to	 utmost	 heteronomy,	 for	
technical	knowledge	and	practice	is	always	propelled	by	given	desires,	which	
tend	to	be	endlessly	multiplied	and	refined	by	reflection.	This	imperative	of	
technical knowledge and practice must be subordinated to the moral imper-
ative:	You can, because you ought to.	Human	action	is	autonomous	only	if	it	
recognises	the	good	as	purpose	in	itself.
Having	said	that,	the	issue	of	how	a	truly	free	relationship	between	the	human	
being and nature  is  achievable  remains  unsolved based on Kant’s  practical  
philosophy.	The	“difference	of	reflection”	(Hegel)	manifests	itself	as	a	strict	
dichotomy between the subject and nature as a mere object or means. This 
dichotomy	holds	for	both	the	spheres	of	right	and	of	morality	as	the	difference	
between  persons  and  things.  All  non-human  natural  beings  are  necessarily  













as	 the	one	who	acts	and	 is	alone	accountable,	whereas	 the	 thing	–	 thereby	
the	whole	of	non-human	nature	–	is	defined	 in	strict	opposition	to	this.	The	
thing  is  that  which  is  not	 a	 self,	but	pure	externality,	 a	physical	 thing	 (res 
corporalis),	which	is	not	free,	does	not act and cannot	be	held	accountable,	
therefore	has	neither	rights	nor	duties.40	This	expresses	the	standpoint	of	re-
















or drive and stands in strict opposition to the will’s rational motivation. 
This	is	because	Kant	can	neither	integrate	the	concept	of	ἐντελέχεια	as	
a	principle	of	life	based	on	his	premises,	nor	can	he	refer	to	something	
like	a	“natural	will”42 understood as immediacy	of	freedom.	Correspon-





on. Nature and freedom stand in opposition, and the mediation of both 














will	 (regardless	of	 the	above-mentioned	opacity	of	 the	moral	 self),	 a	
duty  toward  non-human  beings  can  solely  be  understood  as  an  indi-
rect	 duty	 serving	moral	 perfection.	Hence,	 addressing	 (direct)	 duties	
39	   
I.	Kant,	Critique of Pure Reason,	B	106.
40	   
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42	   
For	the	concept	of	“natural	will”	cf.	G.	W.	F.	
Hegel,	Outlines of the Philosophy of Right,	§	
11.
43	   
Only  the  perspective  on  religion  enables  
an	appreciation	of	nature	within	 the	 frame-
work	 of	 the	 Kantian	 standpoint	 that	 seems	
to	overcome	the	rigid	opposition	of	freedom	
and  nature  (without  resorting  to  the  mere  
“as	 if”	 in	 terms	 of	 reflective	 judgement).	
Human	 being’s	 “naturalness”	 is	 explicitly	
acknowledged  as  a  disposition  (Anlage)	 for	
the	 (moral)	 good.	 Cf.	 Immanuel	 Kant,	Die 










toward non-human beings rests upon an amphiboly.44	What	seems	to	be	
a duty toward	animals	can,	in	fact,	(at	best)	claim	to	be	an	indirect	duty	





from	 it.46	We	 are,	 according	 to	Kant,	morally	 obliged	 to	 sympathise	
with  natural  beings.47  But  the  animals  Kant  mentions  do  not  deserve  
sympathy or gratitude for their own sake,	rather	for	the	sake	of	having	
been in  service	 for	 our	 purposes.48	We	 see	 that	 even	 though	we	 can	
already	derive	from	Kant	respect	for	a	natural	being	as	a	facilitator	for	















tematic	 insight	we	owe	 to	Kant	 –	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 ἐντελέχεια,	 inner	 pur-
posiveness.	What	 is	 here	 already	 in	 sight	 is	 indeed	 the	 overcoming	 of	 the	
standpoint	of	reflection	by	the	thought	that	reason	is	not	a	mere	positing	of	
reflection	but	displays	itself	in	nature,	that	inner	rationality	of	nature	qua or-
ganism	 is	 the	 prerequisite	 of	 freedom	 and	 action.	However,	 due	 to	Kant’s	
endorsement	of	formal	logic	and	the	form	of	judgement,	he	holds	that	inner	
purposiveness	can	only	be	articulated	in	the	mode	of	the	reflective	power	of	





















preme subject of judgement.
What follows if we do not overcome this standpoint?
(1) From	the	point	of	view	of	the	first	emancipation,	it	is	difficult	to	argue	for	
restraint	and	limitation	on	the	colonisation	and	exploitation	of	nature,	even	if	
(Kantian)	morality	is	taken	into	account.	Recognition as an end in itself only 








tion,	it	is	little	wonder	that	we	face	the	issue	of	an	absolutisation of technical 
practice	today.	Within	this	framework,	things	seem	to	be	much	more	straight-
forward	than	they	are	according	to	Kant’s	doctrine	of	postulates.	Technical	






There is a systematic link between absolute technical practice and moral evil. 




the	 link	between	 the	position	of	an	absolute	practice	within	 the	 theoretical	
relationship to the world and moral  evil.	The	I	 is	evil	 if	 it	withdraws	itself	
from	the	actual	“ethical”	life-forms,	considers	itself	to	be	emancipated from 
everything	and	practices	this	delusion	as	well.	Of	course,	the	first	emancipa-
44   
I.	 Kant,	 The  Metaphysics  of  Morals,	 “Doc-
trine	of	Virtue”,	§	16.
45	   
Ibid.,	§	17.
46	   
Ibid.
47	   
Ibid.,	§	34.
48	   
Ibid.,	§	17.
49   
Johann	 Gottlieb	 Fichte,	 “Über	 den	 Grund	
unseres	 Glaubens	 an	 eine	 göttliche	 Weltre-
gierung”,	 in:	 Johan	 Gottlieb	 Fichte,	 Gesa-
mtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften,	vol.	5,	Reinhard	Lauth,	Hans	 
 
Gliwitzky	 (eds.),	 Stuttgart	 –	 Bad	 Cannstatt	
1977,	 p.	 353.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 sole	
meaning	 of	 “nature”	 in	 Fichte.	 To	 the	 ex-
tent  that  the  late  Fichte  overcomes  his  early  
standpoint,	he	developed	a	 richer	concept	of	
nature.	 Cf.	Wolfgang	 Janke,	 Vom Bilde des 
Absoluten:  Grundzüge  der  Phänomenologie  
Fichtes,	De	Gruyter,	Berlin	–	New	York	1993,	
p.	401ff.




and	 Schelling’s	 System	 of	 Philosophy”,	
in:	 Georg	 Wilhelm	 Friedrich	 Hegel,	 Jen-









(2) Solely	focusing	on	 the	enlargement	of	our	ability	 to	secure	 the	regnum 
hominis	(F.	Bacon)	means	an	abstract	recognition	of	nature.	The	relationship	
to	nature	is	not	yet	truly	free	in	the	sense	of	being	with	oneself	in	the	other.	
Natural	 science	 only	 recognises	what	 brings	 benefits	 and	 thus	 an	 increase	
in	power.	 In	 experiments,	 science	 forces	nature	 to	 respond.	 In	 this	way	of	
dealing	with	nature,	we	sit,	as	it	were,	on	her	back	but	we	forget	that	nature	
then has turned her very back on us. Her countenance remains invisible to us. 
Today,	children	grow	up	in	a	world	in	which	machines	almost	entirely	medi-
ate our contact with nature.51	There	is	no	real	otherness	–	therefore,	there	is	
the	real	danger	of	losing	oneself	within	this	sphere	of	mediated	objects,	like	
Narcissus drowned in his mirrored picture.
(3) Since	this	standpoint	essentially	abstracts	from	all	inner	purposiveness	of	
nature,	there	can	be	no	inherent normativity	of	a	natural	being,	which	would	
have	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 human	 action	 –	which	 includes	 the	 human	 body	
as well. The phrase contra naturam  becomes meaningless. This necessarily 
gives rise to a practised Cartesianism	regarding	the	separation	of	the	natural,	
biological	and	the	mental	side.	Nature	and	the	natural	side	of	the	human	being	
are	deprived	of	any	significance	in	and	for	itself.	The	human	body	is	degrad-
ed	 to	 a	 sheer	material	or	horizon	 for	 arbitrary	positings	of	 (self-)identity.52 
According	to	that,	the	biological	gender	is	understood	as	nothing	but	reflect-
ing	contingent	(social)	constructions.	In	addition	to	this,	the	human	body	be-
comes	the	mere	object	of	its	technical	colonisation	in	science.53 This already 
indicates	that	our	conduct	ultimately	always	falls	back	upon	us.





as	 the	 shallowness	of	 standard	ecology.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	under-
stand	that	this	conceptual	shallowness,	the	mere	instrumental	view	of	nature,	
is	nothing	but	the	consequent	expression	of	the	first	emancipation.
(5)	Once the first emancipation shapes our understanding of nature, we can-
not justify a principal difference between a technical product and an object 
of nature. The	reason	for	this	is	that	the	products	of	τέχνη	are	nothing	but	re-





(6) Directly linked to this is the question as to what can the reference to “spe-
cies” or “species-membership” mean at all,	once	we	have	reached	the	stand-
point	of	the	exact	sciences,	the	first	emancipation.	Expressed	in	more	general	
terms,	 there	 is	 the	unsolved	problem	of	 the	“ontological”	status	of	 taxono-
mies,	classifications	and	divisions	into	species	and	genera	and	linked	to	this	





























terms	of	establishing	classifications)	 and	being?	Moreover,	what	 is	 left	 for	
the  abstract  understanding  is  ultimately  the  nominalistic  and  technical  un-






natural	 law.	What	happens	here	 is	an	undue	conflation	 of	 the	ontologically	
relevant	concept	of	species	and	the	purely	technical	and	nominalistic	concept	
51	  
This	 manifests	 itself	 in	 the	 popular	 culture	
also	 as	 peculiar	 enthusiasm	 for	 magic	 and	
superpowers.	The	basic	idea	of	magic	is	that	
we	gain	mastery	over	nature	and	the	other,	but	
no	 longer	 through	 the	 troublesome	 confron-
tation	with	 nature	 and	 the	 other	 themselves,	
but through a simple verbal command. Mean-
while,	we	can	build	machines	that	respond	to	
verbal commands.
52	   
This is related to the currently prevalent ethos 
of	 non-commitment.	 Some	 people	 are	 con-
stantly	on	the	lookout	for	their	“own	identity”,	
with	 the	“search”	 in	 terms	of	avoiding	com-
mitting	oneself	becoming	the	genuine	content	
of	this	consciousness	of	freedom.
53	   
Cf.	the	emergence	of	post-	and	transhumanist	
views.
54	   
This	 is	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 old	 problem	 of	 the	
possibility	of	μέθεξις	and	διαίρεσις,	which	has	
been considered since Plato.
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Johann	 Gottlieb	 Fichte,	 Transscenden-
tale  Logik  II,	 in:	 Johan	 Gottlieb	 Fichte,	
Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie 
der  Wissenschaften. Reihe II: Nachgelas-
sene Schriften 1812-1813,	 vol.	 14,	 From-
mann-Holzboog,	 Stuttgart	 –	 Bad	 Cannstatt	
2006,	p.	200.
56	   
Cf.	 Judith	 K.	 Crane,	 “On	 the	 Metaphys-
ics	 of	 Species”,	 Philosophy  of  Science	 71	





of	species	in	terms	of	(natural)	science.	The concept of species in terms of sci-
ence cannot ground any normative claims or frameworks whatsoever because 
they are nothing but technical-practical tools to orientate within the system 
of appearances.	This	conflation	–	or	confusion	–	is	only	the	expression	of	the	
above mentioned unsolved systematic problem.
(7)	This	standpoint	is	blind	to	the	objective reactions caused by our actions. 
If	we	see	nature	as	a	mere	object	of	domination,	we	will	overlook	that	domi-
nation	always	has	a	corresponding	effect	on	the	ruler.	Already	Francis	Bacon	
stressed that we only master nature by obeying it (natura parendo vincitur).	
Nowadays,	nature’s	reactions	to	our	exploitation	become	visible	and	percep-
tible. The answer nature is giving us today is the so-called uprising of objects 
against	the	human	being.	We	are	not	only	drowning	in	the	trash,	which	falls	
back	 on	 us	 via	 the	 food	 chain,	 but	we	 are	 also	 at	 risk	 of	 drowning	 in	 the	
objects	we	 produce	 in	 that	 their	 operation	 forces	 us	 into	 their  service. All 




4. The Second Emancipation: The Liberation of Nature
Quite	a	 few	philosophers,	 especially	 in	 the	20th	century,	 stressed	 the	need	
for	a	revolution	in	our	relationship	with	nature.	One	of	them	was	Hans	Jonas,	
who	realised	that	nature	could	not	take	responsibility	for	itself,	instead,	this	






can	be	understood	with	 reference	 to	Hegel.	From	Hegel’s	perspective,	 this	







ic that goes a step beyond transcendental logic by thinking the categories and 
forms	in	themselves	and	thereby	unfolding	and	criticising	them.	As long as 
logic fixates the form of judgment (and not the form of inference) as the form 
of mediation, everything that is a self-relationship, the mediation of oneself in 
the other	(be	it	life	or	freedom)	–	nothing	else	is	inner	purposiveness	–	must 
be ultimately regarded as irrational, a-logical. This	applies	equally	to	formal	
logic and transcendental logic. Dialectical logic alone establishes the system-
atic	legitimacy	and	necessity	of	inner	purposiveness.
How Can We Speak about Freedom with Regard to Nature, after Kant?
Speaking	about	a	“liberation	of	nature”	presupposes	that	freedom	is	recog-




about	 freedom	in	nature	would	 involve	an	equivocation.	Why	 is	 that?	 It	 is	
because	we	can	refer	to	freedom	in	relation	to	natural	beings,	more	closely	
organisms,	 but	 then	 the	 term	 “freedom”	 denotes	 something	 fundamentally	
different	than	speaking	about	human	freedom.	To	denote	a	living	being	as	free	
can	only	mean	the	absence	of	external	constraint,	the	unhindered	actualisation	




























chain in the world.59	Departing	from	Kant’s	presuppositions,	“cosmo-
logical	freedom”	can	surely	not	be	understood	as	freedom	of	a	natural	




in contemporary debates about whether or not 
there	“is”	freedom	of	will	and,	if	it	is	the	case,	
how to bring this in line with the worldview 
of	science.
58	   
We	 have	 to	 keep	 such	 a	 misunderstanding	






have demonstrated. The alternative would be 
a	 backslide	 into	 an	 ontology,	 which	 always	
has  trouble  explaining  why  only  human  be-




New York University Journal of Law and Lib-
erty	4	(2009)	1,	pp.	70–111.
59	   
Cf.	Christian	Krijnen,	“Kant’s	Conception	of	
Cosmological  Freedom and its  Metaphysical  
Legacy”,	 in:	 Christian	 Krijnen	 (ed.),	 Meta-
physics of Freedom? Kant’s Concept of Cos-






















a	question	of	logic.	The necessary revolution within our consciousness of na-
ture presupposes an overarching understanding of both nature and the human 





the	logical	form	of	the	concept	as	self-relation that mediates itself in its oth-
er –	and	 this	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 logical	 form	of	 freedom.	Freedom	as	
self-relation	(or	self-determination)	contradicts	the	formal-logical	law	which	
demands the mere avoidance	of	the	contradiction.	But	what	Kant	could	not	





This  covers  both  the  logic  of  life	 or	 the	 living	 individual	 and	 the	 logic	 of	
self-conscious (human) life	(the	idea	of	cognition,	idea	of	the	good),	that	ulti-
mately	grasps	itself	(absolute	idea,	method).	So	the	(Hegelian)	concept	is	not	







the  concept  being  a  self-consciously	 living	 self,	 or	 between	 being-in-itself	





a)		Freedom	of	nature	is	at	first	 to	be	understood	negatively as the disrup-













to the organism consists precisely in the gradual overcoming of this ex-
ternality,	namely	by	establishing ever richer and more concrete forms 
of self-relationships.	A	natural	being	can	be	understood	as	free	in	terms	
of	an	existence	relating	to	itself	or	affirming	itself.	In	the	organism	na-










position  to  each other.  Freedom means  to  be  not  nature.  There  is  no  being 
with	oneself	in	the	other.	Yet	at	the	same	time,	this	very	being	with	oneself	
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For	 a	 profound	 account	 of	 the	 approach-
es	 in	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy	 that	 allow	
for	 thinking	 free	 nature,	 cf.	 Thomas	 Sören	
Hoffmann,	Philosophische  Physiologie:  eine  
Systematik des Begriffs der Natur im Spiegel 
der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,	 From-
mann-Holzboog,	 Stuttgart	 –	 Bad	 Cannstatt	
2003,	Part	III,	p.	237ff.
61	   
Cf.	 Jan	 van	 der	Meulen,	Hegel.  Die  gebro-
chene Mitte,	dissertation,	Hamburg	F.	Meiner,	
Hamburg	1958.
62	   
For	 a	 concise	 description	 of	 the	 relation	 of	
logic	 to	nature	cf.	Thomas	Sören	Hoffmann,	
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – A Propae-
deutic,	Brill,	Leiden	2015,	p.	301ff.
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emancipation. Freedom must be able to find itself in nature – in nature as an-
other self.	If	action	means	to	realise	the	intelligible	–	a	goal	–	in	nature,	then	
this presupposes that nature can be conceived in such a way that it is intelligi-
ble in itself,	i.e.	that	nature	is	not	merely	existence	under	natural	laws	(Kant),	
but that it is the presence of the intelligible or the goal.
What	applies	 to	action	holds	 true	even	more	 fundamentally	 for	 the	consti-








Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit demonstrates this in all its stages.64 The develop-
ment	of	the	subjective	spirit	from	self-feeling	over	intuition,	representation	












mained an ought in Fichte’s philosophy. Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit	shows,	
in	contrast,	that	consciousness	as	(Hegelian)	concept	finds	itself	in	nature	as	
its	objectivity	(which	is	not	the	Kantian	objectivity	any	longer)	and	only in 




terms	of	Hegel	–	 i.e.	 the	self-affirmation	 of	 freedom	–	would	be	pointless.	










The “True Teleological View” and its Consequences
Hegel	characterises	this	perspective	on	nature	as	“the	true	teleological	view,	
which	 is	 the	highest	–	 thus	 consists	of	nature	 as	 free	 in	 its	peculiar	 liveli-
ness”.66	Such	an	approach	to	nature	is	no	longer	focused	on	domination.	It	is	a	
concept	of	nature	centred	around	the	thought	of	inner	purposiveness67	–	which	
















in spatio-temporal externality. And it is by means of this rationality of nature 
that nature can serve as a/the facilitator of freedom in the first place. With this 
insight, the presuppositions of the technical-practical conduct are justified.
Such	an	account	of	nature	is	not	a	mere	doctrine	of	the	usage	of	nature,	in-
stead,	 it	 conceives	 of	 nature	 as	 an	 expression	 and	 representation	of	actual 
(self-)relations,	as	a	 living	context	 to	which	we	belong	–	and	 the	violation	
of	which	affects	us	likewise.	Such	a	Philosophy	of	Nature	can	recognise,	for	
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ness	 cf.	Alison	 Stone,	Petrified Intelligence. 
Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy,	 SUNY	Press,	
Albany	2004.
65	   
Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel,	Philosophy 
of Mind,	translated	from	the	Encyclopedia of 
Philosophical  Sciences	 by	William	Wallace,	
Clarendon	Press,	Oxford	1971,	§	381,	p.	6.
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G.	W.	F.	Hegel,	Encyclopaedia of  the Philo-
sophical Sciences in Basic Outline,	Part	II,	§	
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Kant’s	Account	 of	Teleology	 in	Nature”,	 in:	
Stephen	Houlgate	(ed.),	Hegel and the Philos-
ophy of Nature,	SUNY	Press,	New	York	1998,	
pp.	167–188.
68	   
G.	W.	F.	Hegel,	Encyclopaedia of  the Philo-





concrete	 view	of	 nature.	Freedom is the negation of nature, which has its 













on a theoretical one and thereby free	from	desire	directed	toward	domination	
and	consumption	–	at	least	for	some	moments.	In	these	(rare)	moments,	we	
are	not	designing	a	thoroughgoing	determinate	phenomenon	as	an	object	(in	
terms	of	Kant)	 any	 longer.	 In	 these	moments,	 nature	 does	 not	 appear	 as	 a	
sum-total	of	objects,	a	collection	of	inorganic	matter,	organisms,	etc.,	but	with	
a face,	which	means	as	a	sensuous	being	that	is	at	the	same	time	intelligible.	It	












is	 implicitly	 respected	 and	 through	 linguistic	 forms	 in	which	 this	 respect69 







a rational or moral being. Every stage of actual freedom – every life-form in 
terms of “Sittlichkeit” – relies on this respect. In the sphere of absolute spirit 
this  respect  toward nature  becomes explicit.  This  is  necessary  because  this  
experience	needs	to	be	remembered	and	interpreted,	which	happens	in	art,70 















A	stunning	example	of	this	is	Albrecht	Dürer’s	The Large Piece of Turf 
(1503).	The	grass	seems	to	be	literally	at	the	bottom	of	the	scala nature. 
We	tread	on	it,	leave	it	on	the	wayside	without	taking	further	notice	or	
rip	 it	out,	 as	a	 result	of	 the	 subsumption	under	 the	abstract	universal	
“weed”,	indicating	a	lack	of	functionality.	However,	in	beholding	such	
a	painting,	we	can	evoke	the	consciousness	that	even	a	patch	of	grass	







nature	 as	 an	object	 but	 understands	nature	 as	 being	 related	 to	God’s	
absolute.	As	manifestation	 or	 creation	 of	God,	we	 always	 encounter	
in	 nature	what	 religion	 calls	 “the	 holy”,	 especially	 in	 life	 and	 living	
beings.	 For	 a	 religious	 consciousness,	 nature	 can	 therefore	 never	 be	




that  we have  not  obtained  the  goods  and the  wealth  that  we squeeze  
out	of	nature	by	our	efforts	alone,	but	always	with	nature’s	help,	which	
allows	this	to	happen.	In	sacrifice,	however,	not	only	gratitude	and	re-
spect	 are	 expressed	 (e.g.	 in	 “Thanksgiving”),	 but	 also	 the	 awareness	
that	the	use	and	exploitation	of	nature	demand	“atonement”.	The	sys-
tematic	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 technical-practical	 view	 on	 nature	





the	difference	between	a	human	being	regarded	as	master	and as a stew-
ard	of	creation.	Christendom	introduced	a	new	attitude	toward	nature.	
Paul	explicitly	proclaims	the	liberation	of	the	whole	of	the	creation.71
69	   




ture  as  an other	 self.	The	otherness	 involves	
exactly	a	lack	of	reciprocity.
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Romans	8:20.	This	 liberation	mediates	 itself	
as	 the	 consciousness	 of	 a	 deep	 kinship	with	
all	creatures	of	nature	(cf.	the	“Canticle	of	the	
Sun”	by	Francis	of	Assisi)	 and,	 accordingly,	
as	 the	 demand	 for	 a	 restraint	with	 regard	 to	
our	 transformation	of	nature	 into	 a	world	of	
useful	objects.	In	“The	Life	of	Jesus”	(1795),	




















Rad se bavi rasponom ljudskog odnosa prema prirodi. Taj raspon obuhvaća dvije emancipacije. 
Prva je emancipacija od prirode putem koje se omogućuje gospodarenje prirodom pomoću zna-
nosti i tehnike. Druga emancipacija jest emancipacija od prve emancipacije, izviruća iz uvida 
da o prirodi trebamo misliti i odgovarajuće je poštivati kao drugo sebstvo koje se ukazuje. Ar-
gumentiram da upravo takav iskorak prema takvoj drugoj emancipaciji leži u jezgri revolucije 
svjesnosti o prirodi za koju se čini da se upravo odvija. No urgentno se pitanje javlja o tome 
kako takvo »oslobođenje od prirode« (Hegel) može biti shvaćeno kao održivo, bez zaostajanja 
za postignućima kantovske filozofije i pada u dogmatsku ontologiju ili čak naturalizam. Rad 
uspostavlja sustavni odgovor na to pitanje baveći se nekim ključnim točkama u Kanta i Hegela.
Ključne	riječi
filozofija	prirode,	filozofija	tehnike,	Immanuel	Kant,	Georg	 Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel
Jesus	 as	 follows:	 “But	 once,	 during	 an	 hour	
of	solitary	reflection	 (Luke	4;	Matt.	4),	it	oc-
curred  to  him  that  perhaps  by  studying  na-
ture	 he	might,	 in	 league	with	 higher	 spirits,	
actually	 seek	 to	 transform	 base	 matter	 into	
a	 more	 precious	 substance,	 into	 something	
more	 immediately	 useful	 to	 man,	 e.g.	 con-
verting  stones  into  bread.  Or  perhaps  that  
he	might	 establish	 his	 own	 independence	 of	
nature	altogether	while	hurtling	down	from	a	
high	place.	But	 as	 he	 reflected	 on	 the	 limits	
nature	 has	 placed	 on	man’s	 power	 over	 her,	




one whose cultivation and enhancement is his 
true	life’s	calling.”	–	Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	
Hegel,	“The	life	of	Jesus”,	in:	Georg	Wilhelm	
Friedrich	 Hegel,	 Three essays, 1793-1795: 













Herrschaft über Natur und Befreiung der Natur
Zwei	Stufen	der	Emanzipation
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz handelt von der Spannweite des Naturverhältnisses des Menschen. Diese umfasst 
eine zweifache Emanzipation: die erste Emanzipation als die Emanzipation von der Natur, die 
uns die Herrschaft über diese in Gestalt der Wissenschaft und Technik ermöglicht. Die zweite 
Emanzipation ist die Emanzipation von dieser ersten Emanzipation. Diese entspringt der Ein-
sicht, dass die Natur als ein anderes Selbst, das sich zeigt, zu denken und zu achten ist. Ich ver-
trete die These, dass es bei der gegenwärtigen Auseinandersetzung um unser Naturverhältnis 
im  Kern  um den  Schritt  zur  zweiten  Emanzipation  geht.  Dabei  tritt  aber  das  philosophische  
Problem auf, wie denn in haltbarer Weise von einer „Befreiung der Natur“ (Hegel) gesprochen 
werden kann, ohne hinter die Errungenschaften der Kantischen Philosophie in eine dogmati-
sche Ontologie oder gar einen Naturalismus zurückzufallen? Der Aufsatz zeigt die Grundlinien 




Gouverner la nature et libérer la nature
Deux stades d’émancipation
Résumé
Ce travail traite de la dimension relationnelle de l’homme envers la nature. Cette dimension 
comprend deux émancipations. La première concerne l’émancipation humaine de la nature par 
laquelle il devient possible de gouverner la nature à l’aide de la science et de la technique. 
La seconde émancipation est l’émancipation de la première, et découle de l’idée qu’il est né-
cessaire de penser la nature et de la respecter de manière responsable tel un autre soi qui se 
présente à nous. J’estime précisément qu’une telle avancée se situe au cœur de la révolution 
de conscience de la nature, qui justement, semble se dérouler. La question urgente qui se pose 
est de savoir comment une telle « libération de la nature » (Hegel) peut être comprise comme 
viable, sans laisser derrière elle les acquis de la philosophie kantienne et sans tomber dans une 
ontologie dogmatique, voire dans le naturalisme. Ce travail présente une réponse systématique 
à la question en traitant de certains points clés chez Kant et Hegel.
Mots-clés
philosophie	de	la	nature,	philosophie	de	la	 technique,	Emmanuel	Kant,	Georg	Wilhelm	Frie-
drich Hegel
